Wittgenstein's boredom

Wittgenstein’s boredom
by Ramakrishnan Parthasarathy
consider a subject for what my fingers bring now and assume superficiality, which is of three kinds. i shall proceed to mention only two. one – i may not know much about the subject, in which case i could resort to language play or wallpaper descriptions of the subject’s house. two – i may know lots and yet big lots involve furniture. the original lots may involve knowledge of mere facts, which are not accepted as constituting profundity. original interpretations are closer but they involve borrowed aspects of language that document an understanding, which, in turn, reflects connection of the lines between facts and shading line-locked areas with colours of cognition.
now, my grey cells are grey, and if i make this stupid statement, i can get away with being profound, without knowing about cells or grey but with the assumption of what a stupid statement is. even when i know too much about a subject and also possess the ability to conclude and dissect with originality, i may be limited by my poor expressions in language. although language possesses sort of an objective validity, at least when we hold rules to be true and assume a plurality of beings, the effect of whatever i express is an impression. but how is it possible for me to express when i talk to a wall? how is it possible to impress a wall? i might manage to impress wally but that assumes why in the form of y in the wall? and why doesn’t a wallpaper not reveal the writing on the wall? after all, when i make an impression by shouting too loud, the wall might crack. but then the aforementioned sentence assumes that i look at the wall while talking and that i have the ears of a bat for easily hearing the lowest pitches of the phenomenon.
and if two men were to stand behind a woman and one of the men says “poker,” what is the proof that the other man hears it the same way as it was intended? well, part of the proof lies in his not poking the woman, for he could have also heard it as “poke her.” the other part is unprovable as he might have heard it as “poke her” and not have poked her. or he might have heard it as parker as the other guy may be scottish. or it might not have been english at all, and poker may be a geodesic dome in a subterranean dialect. or the man who said “poker” could’ve changed the meaning to “poke her” when the other man does not poke the woman. tone and spacing of words is also important. poke her is the same as poker when it is pokeher. the aitch remains silent.
i’m bored now. you might think of the preceding short sentence as an example. but it is not. it is a clown story. a clown story is not. but. linguistic gymnastics. after all, i have escaped being superficial by merely not talking about anything concrete at all. but then you might still think that i intended to get my point through. anything to get me through.